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REGULATION OF INSURANCE ADVERTISING PRACTICES:
A JURISDICTIONAL INQUIRY*
THE Supreme Court's holding that the business of insurance is commerce 1
engendered doubts of the validity of state regulatory legislation, previously the
sole means of supervising the industry.2 In response, Congress passed the
*American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
granted, 26 U.S.L. WEnx 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1957) (No. 436); National Cas. Co. v.
FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. WEE 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12,
1957) (No. 435).
1. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (indict-
ment against several fire insurance companies alleging conspiracy to restrain trade in inter-
state commerce in violation of Sherman Act upheld). South-Eastern Underwriters in
effect overruled the holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869), that
the issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction in commerce. Many case's after
Paul had affirmed the proposition that the business of insurance was not commerce. See,
e.g., Hooper v. Calif6rnia, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178
U.S. 389 (1900); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
Since all these cases upheld state statutes in the absence of federal regulation, the Court
in South-Eastern Underwriters was able to distinguish them on the ground that none faced
the issue whether the commerce clause granted Congress power to regulate interstate in-
surance transactions. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra at 534,
544-45.
For comment on South-Eastern Underwriters, see, e.g., Berke, Is the Business of In-
surance Commerce?, 42 MicEa. L. REv. 409 (1943) ; Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57
HARV. L. REv. 937 (1944); Notes, 45 CoLumr. L. REv. 927 (1945), 20 IND. L. REv. 184
(1945), 29 M.ARQ. L. Rav. 55 (1945). See also Timberg, Insurance and Intcrstate Coln-
inerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959 (1941), which preceded and predicted the result.
On the same day that South-Eastern Underwriters was decided, the Court upheld the
application of the National Labor Relations Act to a fraternal association which issued
interstate insurance contracts. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
For earlier recognition of the interstate nature of the insurance business, see Hinkler
v. Eighty-Three Maiden Lane Corp., 50 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (dictum) ; Nehem-
kis, Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-examination, 27 GEO. L.J. 519 (1939) (insurance
companies had pleaded their interstate character as insulation from state regulation);
Berke, A Legal-Economic Discussion of the "S.E.U.A." and "Polish Alliance" Cases, 1944
INs. L.J. 394, 397-98 (same). See also United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, supra at 592 (listing futile efforts to force congressional control of insurance) ; Pat-
terson, The Future of State Supervision of Insurance, 23 TEXAS L. REV. 18, 19 (1944)
(Polish Nat'l Alliance and South-Eastern Underwriters "merely tore away an illusory
veil from a door that was open all the time"). The prosecution of South-Eastern Under-
writers arose because of difficulties encountered by state officials in controlling insurance
under state statutes. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees
on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 26 (1943)
(Attorney General of Missouri appealed for federal intervention).
2. See SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTESTAT CoMmEmcE 1-4 (1945). Such doubts were
basic to Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
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McCarran Act.3 Designed to permit continued state control and taxation,4 the
act also seeks to protect the public interest should state supervision prove in-
adequate. Thus, the federal antitrust laws-including the Federal Trade Corn-
writers Ass'n, supra note 1, at 580-83. The constitutionality of state regulatory statutes
depended on whether local control was appropriate and did not unduly burden commerce.
Id. at 582. Particularly vulnerable were those statutes discriminating between domestic
and foreign insurers or providing for rate-fixing agreements. VANcE, INsURANCE 40-50
(3d ed. 1951).
In a separate opinion, dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Jackson admitted that insurance
was commerce in fact but preferred adherence to the historical fiction. In his view, federal
regulation should be restricted to direct proscription of activities which burdened inter-
state commerce. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra note 1, at 584.
Many insurance companies refused to comply with state tax laws since their officers
feared civil and criminal sanctions for misappropriation of company funds if these laws
were later held unconstitutional. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1.945) ; S.
REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) ; 91 CONG. REc. 478-79 (1945). The situation
was described as "absolute chaos" by Senator Ferguson. Id. at 484. And it had been predicted:
"If the Court should now decide that insurance is commerce or interstate trade an
extremely serious situation would at once arise as the business would then be subject to
the Sherman and Clayton Acts with which many of the regulatory laws of the several
States, including New Jersey, are in direct conflict. This would create a most deplorable
situation, causing a serious disruption in the orderly conduct of this business which is of
such vital public interest." Hearings, supra note 1, at 246 (statement by the Commissioner
of Banking and Insurance of New Jersey). Contra, id. at 150 (statement by U.S. Assist-
ant Attorney General).
For a discussion of the differences in fundamental theory betveen state regulatory
statutes and the federal antitrust laws, see Gardner, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws-
.A Problem in Synthesis, 61 HARv. L. REv. 246 (1948) ; 91 CONG. REc. 479 (1.945). For
examination of factors affecting the validity of state statutes, see Patterson, supra note 1,
at 27-30; Berke, A Legal-Economic Discussion of the "S.E.U.A." and "Polish Alliance"
Cases, 1944 INs. L.J. 394-95; Harrington, An Exploration of the Effects of the S.E.U.A.
Decision, 1944 INs. L.J. 590. Clearly, all state regulation would not have been invalid.
See Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (California conviction of unlicensed
agent of foreign insurance company for acts occurring after South-Eastern Underwriters
and before the McCarran Act upheld). The applicability to state statutes authorizing rate
fixing in the insurance industry of the ruling in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
that state action is not within the purview of the Sherman Act has not been determined.
See North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d 174 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160, 163 n.11 (1951).
3. 59 STT. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
4. The immediate purpose of the act was to stabilize a chaotic situation. H.R. REP.
No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) ; S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
The act declares that continued state regulation and taxation of the insurance business is
in the public interest, that congressional silence is not to be construed as barring such
regulation or taxation and that the insurance business and persons engaged therein are
subject to state laws which relate to the regulation or taxation of the industry.
After South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress could have either remained silent and
allowed case law to establish a dividing line between state and federal jurisdiction, enacted
a comprehensive regulatory scheme to be administered by a federal agency or consented
to continued state regulation. The McCarran Act, as finally approved, bears no resemblance
to bills introduced in 1943 to ward off possible effects of the impending South-Eastern
Underwriters decision. These bills precluded applying the Sherman and Clayton Acts to
the insurance business. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
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mission Act-are made applicable to the insurance industry "to the extent that
such business is not regulated by state law."5 The jurisdictional demarcation
so established has not been effectively crystallized; disagreement exists within
J.udiciary on S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943). Although the advisability of federal
or dual regulation of insurance was discussed at the hearings, the dominant theme of the
bills was that the insurance business was traditionally regulated by the states and that such
regulation was complete and effective. See Hearings, supra note 1. The House version,
H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), passed seventeen days after South-Eastern Under-
writers was decided. 90 CoNa. REc. 6565 (1.944). The Senate version, S. 1362, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943), though reported favorably, Note, Insurance: A Survey of State Rate
Regulation, 33 GEo. L.J. 70, 72 (1944), never came to a vote. See Note, 60 YALE L.J.
160, 162 (1951). The original version of S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), which be-
came the McCarran Act, was a draft prepared by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. 90 CONG. REC. 8482, 9628, A4403 (1944). As reported, this bill expressly
made the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to
insurance. The NAIC feared FTC pre-emption of the field. Insurance Round Table, 1944
INS. L.J. 716, 718. With the exception of Sherman Act prohibitions against coercion, boy-
cott or intimidation, all other federal antitrust laws were to be inapplicable only to the
extent they invalidated, impaired or superseded state laws regulating insurance. 91 CoNG.
Rac. 478-80 (1945). This provision was satisfactory to insurance commissioners and com-
panies. Id. at 479. As the debate indicates, it was also highly ambiguous. Id. at 478-88.
Amendment from the floor removed the Sherman and Clayton Acts from the general class
of federal laws which were not to invalidate, impair or supersede state laws unless specifi-
cally applicable to insurance. Id. at 488. So reading, the bill went to conference, from
which it was reported in essentially its present form, see note 5 infra, which was still
ambiguous. Compare 91 CoNG. REc. 1443 (1945) (Senator Ferguson: legislation alone to
* prevent federal regulation), with id. at 1444 (Senator McCarran: only effective state regu-
lation to preclude federal intervention). See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160, 163 n.11 (1951) ;
Dowling, Insurance Regulation, 5 J. Pun. L. 110, 113 (1956). Debate lasted only two days.
91 CoNG. REc. 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945). The act represents a hasty effort by Congress to
allay the confusion caused by South-Eastern Underwriters without estopping future federal
control. Id. at 1487.
5. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952) : "(b) No Act of Con-
gress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon
such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided,
That after June 30, 1948... the Sherman Act... the Clayton Act ... the Federal Trade
Commission Act ... shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."
The act also provided that the Sherman, Clayton, FTC, and Robinson-Patman Acts
should not apply to any aspects of the insurance business until after the expiration of a
three-year moratorium. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1952). This
moratorium was intended to allow the states to adjust their regulatory programs. 91 CoNG.
Rzc. 1442 (1945).
The Sherman Act, however, was expressly made applicable "to any agreement to boy-
cott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 59 STAT. 34 (1945),
15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1952); see United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, 148 F.
Supp. 915 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 78 Sup. Ct. 96 (1957) (group boycott affecting
interstate commerce violated Sherman Act). See also Spiegle v. Board of Fire Under-
writers, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946) (California Cartwright Act does not conflict




the Federal Trade Commission 6 as well as between the Commission and the
courts. 7 Although the obvious public interest in insurance practices suggests
that adequacy of supervision be a prime consideration in adjusting the roles
of federal and state authorities, the extent and efficacy of control has been gen-
erally ignored by both the FTC and the courts.
8
All members of the Federal Trade Commission postulate constitutional
limitations on the power of a state to regulate interstate insurance within its
borders. A majority restricts state jurisdiction derived from the McCarran
Act to transactions which are in interstate commerce only because of their
effect upon other transactions conducted directly across state boundaries. 9 Pre-
sumably predicated on cases denying Congress the power to delegate legislative
authority,' 0 this position overlooks qualifications permitting congressional con-
sent to state legislation where a significant value in national uniformity is
absent." While Congress clearly could have established an extensive regula-
6. See, e.g., American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57
Transfer Binder ff 25954 (FTC 1956) ; National Cas. Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57
Transfer Binder 11 26010 (FTC 1956); North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder 11 26396 (FTC Feb. 20, 1957) ; Federal Life and Cas. Co.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder 1 25997 (FTC 1956).
7. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), revers-
ing CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder ff 25954 (FTC 1956); National Cas.
Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), reversing CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57
Transfer Binder ff 26010 (FTC 1956).
8. See notes 9, 16, 17, 22 infra.
9. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer
Binder ff 25954 (FTC 1956).
The FTC does not have jurisdiction over matters merely affecting interstate commerce.
Commission power depends on actual activity in interstate commerce. See FTC v. Bunte
Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLtrm. L.
REv. 1018, 1023 (1956). However, most insurance business in the United States falls with-
in this category. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
5q9-43 (1944).
10. See Brief for Complaining Counsel, p. 4, American Hospital and Life Ins. Co.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder ff 25954 (FTC 1.956), relying on In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891) ("Congress can neither delegate its own powers nor
enlarge those of a State"), and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920)
("Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States-by nature this is non-dele-
gable"). See also American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., supra at 35842. However, Rahrer
held that Congress could adopt state law if competent to regulate in the area. And the
basis of Knickerbocker Ice was the need for national uniformity in admiralty. See also
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917) (Webb-Kenyon Act
divesting liquor of its interstate character held constitutional) ; Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902) (federal bankruptcy law recognizes exemptions granted
by local law).
In structure, the McCarran Act is similar to the Act of Aug. 7, 1789, c. 9, § 4, 1 STAT.
54, which declared that pilots should be regulated by state laws enacted for that purpose.
See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851) (upholding 1803 Penn-
sylvania law regulating pilots since subject matter did not require uniform, exclusive fed-
eral regulation).
11. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (upholding constitutionality
of the McCarran Act), is the leading exposition of the "consent theory" which validates
19591
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tory system instead of passing the McCarran Act,'12 uniformity of control over
the insurance industry has been held unnecessary. 3 TMoreover, the Commis-
sion's jurisdictional determination contradicts its own view that the act was
designed to restore state regulation to the position it occupied before insurance
was declared commerce. 14 Prior to that declaration, each state supervised all
insurance activities occurring within its borders. 1 The Commission minority,
federal legislation permitting state laws to operate in sectors of interstate commerce other-
wise barred to them by the Constitution. Although its constitutional basis has never been
explained by the Court, the theory is firmly established. See Dowling, Interstate Com-
mnerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUD. L. Rrv. 547, 552-60 (1947) (criticiz-
ing rationalization in Prudential Ins. Co.) ; Dowling, Congress and Insurance, 5 J. Pui. L.
110 (1956). See also Note, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation,
45 COLUMN. L. Ray. 927 (1945). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (dictum) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
315 (1945).
The McCarran Act is not a delegation of power by Congress, Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, supra at 439-40, nor an affirmative exercise of the legislative power described
in Clark Distilling and In re Rahrer, id. at 438. It is not an adoption of state law, ibid.,
but an exercise of the power to consent, in effect freeing state control of insurance from
any commerce clause inhibitions. See, generally, Mermin, "Cooperative Federalism" Again:
State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal
Requirements: I, 57 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 n.61 (1947).
12. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is "complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, orher [sic] than are pre-
scribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). Re-
straints on the exercise of this power "must proceed from political rather than from judicial
processes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). South-Eastern Underwriters
constitutes judicial recognition of congressional power to assume full control of "interstate"
insurance. For evidence that Congress so understood the case, see 91 CONG. Rac. 478
passin (1945).
13. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431-33 (1946). The Court approved
a finding that "the McCarran Act is, in effect, a determination by Congress that the busi-
ness of insurance, though done in interstate commerce, is not of such a character as to
require uniformity of treatment within the distinction taken in the doctrine of Cooley v.
Board of Wardens . . . ." Id. at 431 n.39. See Delaney, The Future of State Regulation
of Insurance, 1950 INs. L.J. 402. But see SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COIMERCE
7-8 (1945).
14. "[T]he McCarran-Ferguson Act was designed to permit the States to regulate,
in the traditional manner, the business of insurance." American Hospital and Life Ins. Co.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder ff 25954, at 35839 (FTC 1956).
15. Only the jurisdictional aspects of due process restricted state regulation of insur-
ance prior to South-Eastern Underwriters. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
416 & n.14 (1946). Thus, a state could regulate the activities of a foreign corporation only
to the extent they occurred within its borders. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas,
260 U.S. 346 (1.922). See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938)
(California not permitted to tax reinsurance contracts entered into in Connecticut on policies
originally made in California) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (contract made
in New York cannot be governed by Louisiana law). The McCarran Act was not intended
to change the rule of these cases. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945). But
see, generally, on the lower standards which have recently been required by substantive
due process, Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943) (insured's state has
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envisaging a "flow of commerce" over which the states have no prerogative
and in which Congress would be constitutionally disabled from delegation,"6
uses reasoning similar to that of the majority to define a narrower area of
federal jurisdiction.
17
Recent efforts by the FTC to control advertising practices of health and
accident insurance companies have provoked two circuit courts into definitive
resolution of the jurisdictional lines between national and state instrumental-
ities. Many health and accident companies advertise primarily by brochures
mailed from home offices either directly to consumers or to agents for trans-
mission to consumers. The FTC ordered several such companies to cease and
desist from circulating false and misleading advertising in interstate com-
merce.18 The Fifth Circuit, in American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC,'"
and the Sixth Circuit, in National Cas. Co. v. FTC,20 denied the Commis-
sion's authority to issue the orders on substantially identical grounds. Each
rejected the constitutional limitations imposed on state authority by the Com-
mission. 21 Construing the act's denial of federal control over insurance prac-
recognizable interest in the contract) ; Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) (resident
agent statute does not violate due process) ; Dowling, Congress and Inmrance, 5 J. PuB.
L. 110, 111 (1956) ; Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version,
47 COLUM. L. Ray. 547, 550-51 (1947).
16. See American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REGa. RaP. 1956-57 Trans-
fer Binder ff 25954, at 35846 (FTC 1956).
17. The "flow" encompasses mail-order insurance transmitted directly from a company
in one state to consumers in another, see Travelers Health Ass'n, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
1956-57 Transfer Binder 26327, at 36114 (FTC 1956) (concurring opinion), but not that
transmitted first to agents, American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., supra note 16. It may
also include interstate television and radio advertising. See Federal Life and Cas. Co.,
CCH TRAE REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder ff 25997 (FTC 1956) (dissenting opinion).
See also North American Acc. Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REG. RaP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder
f1 26396, at 36154 (FTC Feb. 20, 1957) (dissenting opinion). But see, Note, The Regula-
tion of Advertising, 56 CoLuma. L. Rlv. 1018, 1076 (1956).
18. Complaints were originally issued against 41 companies, including the largest
health and accident insurers. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., CCH TRADE REG. RaE.
1956-57 Transfer Binder ff 25954 (FTC 1956). A recent count indicates that the Commis-
sion has issued final orders in 14 cases, 6 of which were stipulations to consent, see note
48 infra. In 18 completed proceedings before hearing examiners, 13 initial decisions to
cease and desist and 5 dismissals were ordered. The 41 complaints were the result of 2,800
investigations. See Commissioner Gwynne, quoted in McConnell, State Regulation v. State
Regulation plus Regulation by Multiple, Decentralized, Independent Federal Agencies,
1956 Ixs. L.J. 697, 701. For background on these complaints, see Fraizer, Federal Trade
Commission Jurisdiction?, 22 I.Ns. CouxsE. J. 467 (1955) ; McAlevey, Present Status of
State Regulation of the Accident and Health Business, 1956 INs. L.J. 39.
19. 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. W=ax 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12,
1957) (No. 436).
20. 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12,
1957) (No. 435).
21. 243 F.2d at 724; 245 F.2d at 886. Only the Fifth Circuit admitted the possibility
of an area of interstate insurance necessarily restricted to federal jurisdiction. See 243
F.2d at 724.
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tices regulated by the states, both courts considered state regulation synony-
mous with state legislation.2 2 This rationale offers an easy formula for solution
of jurisdictional conflicts. The sovereign authorized to regulate any particular
of the insurance business can be determined by reference to state statutes; if
state law covers the practice concerned, state jurisdiction is exclusive.
Since individuals injured by misleading insurance advertising cannot secure
adequate compensation, meaningful protection against such practices depends
upon preventive government sanctions.23 Material deception most frequently
occurs with respect to noncancelability and effective dates of policies, extent
or .duration of coverage or benefits payable, and applicant's health require-
ments. 24 Misleading statements disseminated to the public through a variety
of media are relied upon by consumers lacking access to sample policies prior
to purchase. 25 Moreover, the average policy is so complex that consumers are
unlikely to detect material differences between its provisions and the simple,
intelligible advertising which induces the sale.26 Consequently, in most instances
the consumer's first hint of a discrepancy between his actual and supposed
coverage does not occur until he suffers sickness or injury and the company
refuses to pay his claim. Restitution of premiums paid may not cover the loss
suffered,2 7 and reformation of the contract to conform with advertising relied
22. 243 F.2d at 723; 245 F.2d at 888.
23. The function of the FTC is preventive rather than punitive or remedial. FTC v.
Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) ; 51 CONG. REc. 11455 (1914).
24. The questioned practices are set forth in the FTC cease and desist orders cited in
note 6 supra. See also McCarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail-Order Accident
and Health Insurance Policies and Advertising, 23 INs. COUNSEL J. 82, 84-86 (1956);
note 26 infra.
25. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., CCH TPADE REG. Rm. 1956-57 Transfer
Binder 1 25954, at 35844 (FTC 1956) ; McCarter, supra note 24, at 84. Misleading adver-
tisements are not cured by truthful representations to the buyer before purchase. Carter
Products, Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Fairyfoot Products Co. v. FTC, 80
F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1935). See also note 26 infra.
26. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the standard of public sophistication
used to measure "deception" is less than that of the reasonable man. FTC v. Standard
Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). And, on the strength of language in Standard Educa-
tion which apparently brands a false advertisement as necessarily misleading, id. at 116,
the courts have moved to even wider protection. See, e.g., Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166
F.2d 348, 358-59 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir.
1946) ; General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940). See also United
States v. Sylvanus, 1.92 F.2d 96, 105 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952):
"It goes without saying almost that it is extremely difficult for a layman to understand
the terms and conditions of such policies as these . . . ." But see Moretrench Corp. v.
FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Rosenblum v. FTC, 214 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954).
27. Recision and restitution has been held a proper remedy for an insured whose ex-
pectations are unrealized due to representations, innocent or otherwise, by the insurer.
Herman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 678, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1939). See Hogben v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 69 Conn. 503, 38 Atl. 214 (1897) ; Beckwith v. Ryan, 66 Conn.
589, 34 Atl. 488 (1895) ; New Era Life Ass'n v. Weigle, 128 Pa. 577, 18 At. 393 (1899).
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NOTES
upon is unlikely.2  In addition, even if the requisite intent could be proved, a
tort action for misrepresentation may lie only against the agents perpetrating
the deceit and hence be no more successful than they are solvent.29
Although the public interest requires effective government prohibition of
deceptive insurance advertising, measures adopted by the states are inadequate.
Violations of cease and desist orders issued by state regulatory agencies pur-
suant to fair trade practices acts-enacted in a majority of states 30-- often
involve inconsequential penalties.31 Administrative machinery established to
supervise the insurance business within a state is frequently so limited that no
significant attention can be given to advertising practices.32 Even adequately
28. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ruse, 8 Ga. 534 (1850) ; Fowler v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 1.16 N.Y. 389, 22 N.E. 576 (1889) ; Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
23 N.Y. 516 (1861) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 236 (2d ed. 1930). But see Southern Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Montague, 84 Ky. 653, 2 S.V. 443 (1887).
29. Insurance contracts typically provide that the application and the policy constitute
the entire contract between the parties and that no agent is authorized to alter or amend
their terms. PATrERSON, CASES ON INSURANCE 806 (3d ed. 1955). See Peters v. Colonial
Life Ins. Co., 128 Pa. Super. 21, 193 At. 460 (1937) (limitations on agents' authority in
policies effective) ; Maddox v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 79 Ga. App. 164, 53 S.E.2d 235 (1949)
(same). But see VANCE, INSURANCE 449 (2d ed. 1930).
30. In addition to the 38 states which have enacted the Model Trade Practices Act,
see note 54 infra, the following states prohibit misrepresentation of policy terms: ALA.
CODE tit. 28, § 26 (Supp. 1955) ; CAT. INS. CODE §§ 780-84, 1731; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-
1012 (Supp. 1957); Iu.. REv. STAT. c. 73, § 761 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.660
(Supp. 1957) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 40-1939, 40-1941, 40-1942 (Supp. 1957) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 736.608, 737.550 (1955); WASH. RaV. CODE §§ 48.30.010, 48.30.040 (Supp.
1957).
31. Compare, e.g., ARic. STAT. ANN. § 66-171.1 (Supp. 1955) (penalty for violation
not to exceed $50; if violation willful, penalty not to exceed $500) ; CONN. Ga. STAT.
§ 2820d (Supp. 1955) (same) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.11 (Supp. 1956) (same); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. c. 60, § 156 (Supp. 1957) (same) ; S.C. CODE § 37-1221 (Supp. 1955)
(same), with 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1952) (penalty for
each violation of FTC cease and desist order not to exceed $5,000; if violation continuous,
$5,000 for each day of duration). But see, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 5649-11 (Supp. 1957)
(insurer's license to do business may be revoked or suspended in addition to or in lieu of
maximum fine of $1,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-11 (Supp. 1956) (penalty not to
exceed $5,000 for each violation). See also statutory authorization to enjoin violation, e.g.,
ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 61.1411(b) (Supp. 1954); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.023 (1955);
WASH. REv. CODE § 48.02.080(3) (Supp. 1957); 43 C.J.S., Injunctioju § 150 (1945).
On general provisions for license suspension or revocation, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 2786d (Supp. 1955) ; DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 329 (Supp. 1956) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.091 (1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1457 (Supp. 1956); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 24.12064 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3303 (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. § 200.14
(1955).
32. In Delaware, for example, the statute staffs the department entrusted with full
responsibility for supervision of the insurance industry with two executives, two clerks
and one actuary. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 307, 309-11 (Supp. 1956). See also GA. CODE
ANN. § 56-101 (Supp. 1955) (Comptroller General serves as Insurance Commissioner and
may appoint a deputy).
Department effectiveness may be further limited by outside pressures. See, e.g., Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 108-09 (powerful insurance lobbies exert strong influence on state
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staffed state insurance departments are often handicapped by constricting ad-
ministrative techniques. The New York department, for example, acts solely
on a complaint basis; no continuous or recurring investigations of advertising
practices are undertaken.
3 3
These shortcomings are compounded by jurisdictional limitations on state
control. Maximum protection is afforded consumers dealing with insurance
companies incorporated by states which prohibit unauthorized foreign sales.
3
4
Even these consumers, however, find their state with limited capacity to protect
them from deceptive mail-order advertising and sales.35 Terminating the local
authority of an offending foreign company may bring about revocation of that
company's domestic authority to sell within the offended state's borders. But
absent further action by the domestic state, continued advertising and selling
regulation) ; Patterson, supra -note 1, at 30-37 (discussion of needed reforms in state in-
surance departments after passage of the McCarran Act). High personnel turnover in
state insurance departments also impedes effective regulation. See N.Y. State Insurance
Commissioner Dineen, The Rating Problem, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSUR-
ANcE LAW, AwEzicAN BAR ASSOCIATION 105-06 (1945).
In addition to supervising insurance advertising practices, state regulatory schemes gen-
erally require the administrator to process licensing of companies and agents, audit annual
statements, collect premium taxes and approve policy forms. Fraizer, stupra note 18.
33. 1. NEW YORK STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COM-
PANIES 11, 32-65 (Straub ed. 1953). "If the State of New York with its vast resources
and its immense Insurance Department cannot and does not regulate the unfair or deceptive
acts or practices of insurers who owe their very corporate life to it, it can scarcely be ex-
pected that the lesser States in the constellation of the Union can accomplish anything by
similar acts and powers." Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. ff 26553 (FTC June 20, 1957) (initial decision). See United States v. Sylvanus, 192
F.2d 96, 104 (7th Cir. 1951.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952) (general ineffectiveness of
Illinois Insurance Department).
The FTC regularly inspects commercial announcements and representations and in-
vestigates those of a suspicious nature. GELLER, ADvERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS 163-66
(1952). But see, Donovan, State Regulation of Insurance, 1956 INS. L.J. 11, 14 (FTC
worse than the worst state insurance department). Donovan was formerly counsel for the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. See Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under
the McCarran Act, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473 (1950).
34. See COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-40 (Supp. 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-109
(Supp. 1957); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40-214 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-
1314 to -1317 (Supp. 1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-9 (Supp. 1957); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3905.44 (Anderson Supp. 1956) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 736.645 (1955) ; S.D. CODE § 31.1104-1
(Supp. 1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-7-9 (Supp. 1957). See also CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 2816d (Supp. 1955) (foreign unfair trade practices).
Some states prohibit domestic companies from engaging in unauthorized foreign busi-
ness only when the foreign state has enacted reciprocal legislation. See CAL. INS. CODE
§ 706.7; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.38-.40 (Supp. 1956); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.585
(1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1251 (Supp. 1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 195
(Supp. 1957) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 402, § 54 (Supp. 1955) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 26-0719
(Supp. 1949); WASH. REv. CODE § 48.07.150 (Supp. 1957).
35. The business done by mail-order insurers is considerable. See McCarter, supra
note 24, at 86 (the annual premiums paid mail-order companies for health and accident
policies estimated to be $67,500,000).
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by mail to the citizens of the offended state is possible. The offended state
cannot enforce penal sanctions upon an absent defendant, 36 nor can it require
a state with power over the defendant to take such action.3 7  Clearly, state
supervision thus geared to the degree of co-operation which can be invoked
from foreign sovereigns is a control medium of limited utility. s And, since
the majority of states do not proscribe unauthorized foreign business, even
optimum co-operation would yield minimal regulation.
39
The American Hospital and National Casualty construction of the McCar-
ran Act--equating legislation to regulation 4 0-- fosters inadequate supervision
of the insurance industry. State enforcement machinery, lagging behind its
statutory framework 41 and circumscribed by territorial limitations, leaves a
void area not reached in fact by the states and into which the FTC cannot
enter.4 2 Nevertheless, some federal control of deceptive insurance advertising
36. In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), the State Corpora-
tion Commission had ordered the Association, a mail-order health insurer from Nebraska
without tangible assets in Virginia and unlicensed to operate there, to cease and desist from
further offerings or sales in Virginia until it complied with the state blue-sky law. The
Court held that the cease and desist order based upon substituted service did not violate
due process. However, no indication was given of means by which the Commission might
enforce its order. Both injunction and fine appear futile since no agents or property exist
within the state. The Uniform Unauthoriced Insurers Act, permitting substituted service
on unauthorized insurers on suits on policies, has been adopted in most states. See McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 26 U.S.L. WEEE: 4073 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1957), reversing 288
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (judgment obtained under California version of uniform
act entitled to full faith and credit). However, these statutes only apply to suits on policies
and are not regulatory. See Travelers Health Ass'n, supra at 653 (concurring opinion).
In one state, substituted service is statutorily authorized in a regulatory context. N.D.
Laws 1951, c. 188. While cease and desist orders may thus be obtained against "absent"
insurers, the problem of enforcement remains.
37. See Note, Reaching the Out-Of-State Mail-Order Insurer, 64 HARv. L. REv. 482
(1951) ; Comment, Unlicensed Foreign Insurance Companies: The Jurisdiction and En-
forcement Problems, 17 Mo. L. Rxv. 73 (1952). But see Mcarter, supra note 24, at 90;
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcenent of Penal and Govermnental Clahns, 46 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1932); Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 187 (1957).
38. 'See Travelers Health Ass'n, CCH TcADE Rm. RE. 1956-57 Transfer Binder
126327, at 36114 (FTC 1956) (concurring opinion). But see Patterson, supra note 1, at
37-38.
39. When an insurer is not domiciled and incorporated in the same state, co-operation
may also be solicited from the state of domicile. However, only Nebraska proscribes un-
fair foreign practices of domiciled insurers. Neb. Laws 1957, c. 191, § 2, amending NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-1503 (Supp. 1953).
40. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 32, 33 supra and accompanying text. Some companies have even re-
quested stricter state enforcement policies. McCarter, supra note 24, at 102.
42. A possible remedy might be for the states to make mail solicitation within their
borders by unauthorized insurers unlawful and for Congress to make use of the mails in
violation of these statutes a federal offense. Cf. Note, Reaching the Out-Of-State Mail-
Order Insurer, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 482, 489 (1951) ; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898) ;
Note, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 927,
935 (1945).
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may be exercised by the Justice and Post Office Departments without infring-
ing on state prerogatives under the McCarran Act. Since post office fraud
orders 43 and prosecutions for criminal mail fraud 44 are unlikely to invalidate,
impair or supersede state insurance laws, 45 they may be directed against mem-
bers of the industry.46 But both of these enforcement measures require proof
of intent to defraud as well as the dissemination of a misleading statement and
thus may not reach the whole range of objectionable practices.47 Furthermore,
43. 26 STAT. 466 (1890), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1952) (Postmaster General
may, upon evidence satisfying him that a person is making false or fraudulent representa-
tions in the conduct of a scheme or device through the mails, mark "Fraudulent! ' and
return to the sender all mail addressed to that person).
The fraud order was early held to apply to commercial advertisements. Harris v. Rosen-
berger, 145 Fed. 449, 458 (8th Cir. 1906). See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56
CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1042 (1956) (collecting cases). When no longer satisfied that a
person is violating the mail fraud statute, the Postmaster General has a duty to revoke-
not merely suspend-the mail fraud order. New Orleans Nat'l Bank v. Merchant, 18 Fed.
841. (C.C.E.D. La. 1884). Intent is determined by the Postmaster General. 26 STAT. 466
(1890), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1952). But the determination is reversible upon a
showing of abuse of discretion. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 139-40 (1922) ; Cates v.
Haderlein, 189 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1951).
The Post Office Department has a stipulation procedure similar to that of the FTC.
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Adinistrative Procedure
in Governmnt Agendes, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 12, at 16-17 (1940).
See note 48 infra.
44. 62 STAT. 763 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952). The elements of the
criminal and mail fraud statutes are similar. Atlanta Corp. v. Olesen, 124 F. Supp. 482,
484 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Nevertheless, since the latter is administrative and preventive, while
the former is criminal and punitive, significant differences exist in their application. See
Sanden v. Morgan, 225 Fed. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) ; cf. Harrison v. United States, 200 Fed.
662, 667-69 (6th Cir. 1912). The government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
to sustain a criminal charge. In judicial review of fraud orders, on the other hand, the
burden is on the defendant to show that the Postmaster General has abused his discretion.
Sanden v. Morgan, supra at 268-89. See note 43 supra.
Criminal prosecutions are seldom brought in the advertising area because of the severity
of the sanction and the difficulty of establishing the requisite intent to defraud. Note, The
Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1041 & n.133 (1956).
45. See text at note 51. infra.
46. See United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943
(1952). Sylvanus, a criminal mail fraud conviction for misrepresentation in insurance
advertising, held the McCarran Act inapplicable and state insurance regulation irrelevant.
Since the McCarran Act does not except mail statutes from its purview, see 59 STAT. 34
(1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952), note 5 supra, such acts appear applicable to
insurance advertising unless construed to invalidate, supersede or impair state laws regu-
lating the industry. The mail statutes require proof of intent to deceive in addition to the
fact of misrepresentation, see note 47 infra, and thus do not appear to conflict with state
supervision exercised through unfair trade practices acts. However, should the mail stat-
utes be construed contrary to Sylvanus, the McCarran Act would insulate insurance adver-
tising from their reach.
47. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1949) (mail fraud). United States v. Syl-
vanus, supra note 46, at 108-09 (criminal sanction) ; accord, Hawley v. United States, 133
F.2d 966, 972 (10th Cir. 1943) (good faith a defense) ; Post v. United States, 135 Fed.
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neither department is organized to patrol advertising material, and each lacks
the valuable experience of the FTC in the field.
48
Adequate supervision of insurance advertising is, therefore, dependent upon
a construction of the McCarran Act giving the FTC jurisdiction wherever
1, 9 (5th Cir. 1905). See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1018,
1040 (1956) (collecting cases). Intent to deceive is not prerequisite to an FTC cease and
desist order, since its purpose is consumer protection and a misleading statement is not
cured by the absence of an intent to defraud. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67
(1934) ; D. D. D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
Under both mail statutes and the Federal Trade Commission Act, whether someone is
in fact defrauded is immaterial if the mails are used in furtherance of a scheme to deceive.
United States v. Sylvanus, supra note 46, at 105-06; Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941). But mail fraud may require that the representa-
tions have a tendency to deceive. Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463, 472 (S.D. Cal.
1954). And the FTC can act only where such a tendency exists. E.g., S. Buchsbaum &
Co. v. FTC, 160 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947) ; D. D. D. Corp. v. FTC, supra at 682; Gimbel
Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941). See Atlanta Corp. v. Olesen, 124 F.
Supp. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (proof of an incorrect statement or misrepresentation is not
sufficient to prove a violation).
48. The FTC can enjoin false advertising which either establishes an unfair method
of competition or is a deceptive practice. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 719
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) (1), (b) (1952). The main function of the Com-
mission has long been to control advertising. See Note, The Regulation of Advertising,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1022 n.26 (1956). The Commission has developed a stipulation
procedure by which the advertiser consents to cease and desist from condemned practices
without the expenditure of money and time required by a formal proceeding. Id. at 1034-
35. This informal method of control is not a final order. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1952). Therefore, a violation is not penalized under 38 STAT. 719
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (1952), see note 31 supra. A consent order, even
if observed, is not a bar to further proceedings. See Rock v. FTC, 117 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1941). The Stipulation for Consent Order has been used extensively by the Commission
in its campaign against health and accident insurance practices. See note 18 supra.
One federal court has suggested that the mail fraud statutes be used only when a clear
scheme to defraud exists; otherwise, the matter should be handled by an agency experienced
in regulating. Pinkus v. Walker, 61. F. Supp. 610 (D.N.J. 1945), nodified, 338 U.S. 269
(1949). The FCC also is a potential regulator of advertising through its broad licensing
power. 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1952) (criterion for granting or renew-
ing a broadcasting license is whether issuance will further "public interest, convenience,
and necessity"). The commission sanction operates directly against the broadcaster. How-
ever, it may have an indirect effect upon an advertiser and has been used for this purpose.
See, e.g., Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2 F.C.C. 455 (1936); WSBC, Inc., 2 F.C.C.
293 (1936) ; Ben S. McGlashan, 2 F.C.C. 145 (1935). As a matter of policy, advertising
complaints are referred to the FTC. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1940).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952) (provision similar to the mail fraud statute making
fraud by wire, radio or television a criminal offense). However, this statute has been used
only to convict for a fraudulent scheme carried out by telegram. Wiltsey v. United States,
222 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1955). See Esquire Inc. v. Walker, 151. F.2d 49, 55 (1945), aff'd
sub nona. Hannegan v. Esquire Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946): "We believe that the Post
Office Officials should experience a feeling of relief if they are limited to the more prosaic
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state regulation is ineffective. Not only does the act bear such a construction,
it suggests a congressional intent to require more than legislation from the
states if federal control is to be prohibited.40 If regulation and legislation were
considered equivalent, the express proviso making federal antitrust law appli-
cable to insurance to the extent the industry is not "regulated" by the states
would be functionless. ° The section of the act containing the proviso also pro-
hibits construing federal statutes to invalidate, impair or supersede state "laws"
enacted to regulate insurance. 51 This prohibition would itself be sufficient to
preclude federal intervention through the FTC if state legislation alone were
intended as the test. Addition of the proviso, explicitly referring to the Fed-
function of seeing to it that 'neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays
these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.' "
Moreover, since regulation of advertising by a rigid set of rules is not feasible, a method
of control similar to the Trade Practice Conference of the FTC may be desirable. See
Fraizer, supra note 18. To employ this voluntary conference method effectively, a nation-
wide conference to promulgate rules by the FTC, see Nature of Trade Practice Rules, 3
CCH TRADE REG. REP. [ 20002 (FTC 1955), rather than a separate conference in each of
the states, is necessary. In 1950, the FTC promulgated rules with respect to mail-order
insurance, but these were later repealed. 3 CCH TRADE RE . REP. ff 20187 (FTC 1956).
More recently, the Commission established rules governing health and accident insurance.
Trade Practice Conference Rules, Accident and Health Ins. Industry, 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. i[ 20029 (FTC 1956). These rules are a guide to the industry, and violations are
not sanctioned as such. Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1018,
1083 (1956).
49. "[T]he Congress proposes by this bill to secure adequate regulation and control
of the insurance business." H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) ; S. REP.
No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). See also 90 CONG. REc. A3120 (1944) (effective
state regulation protecting the interests of a policyholder the best means to avoid federal
regulation). Congress was aware of the inadequacies of state regulation. See, e.g., Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 55, 80, 31, 142, 168, 131. The need for reform was also recognized
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. See Orfield, Improzing State
Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. REv. 219, 230-61 (1948). For the position that
regulate means actual control in the public interest and not merely legislation, see N.Y.
Insurance Superintendent Dineen, The Rating Problem, in PROCrEDINGS OF THE SElCTION
op INsuRANcE LAW, AmERiCAN BAR AssociATIoN 104, 109 (1945) ("To regulate means
to regulate-not to go through the motions"), and authorities there cited: 91 CoxG. REc.
1478-80, 1488 (1945); White House Release, March 10, 1945 (statement by President
Roosevelt upon signing the McCarran Act, quoted in Donovan, Regulation of Insurance
Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 478 (1950)): "[Tlhe antitrust
laws ... will be applicable ... to the business of insurance except to the extent that the
states have assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility,
for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance business may be involved." Thom-
erson, Federal Trade Commission Surveys State Insurance Laws, 1950 I:is. L.J. 333, 335-
36, and authorities cited. But see, McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium
Under Public Law 15 Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 542 (1948) : "The inquiry will be:
'Is this practice regulated by State law ?'-not 'Is it effectively regulated?' "
50. See 57 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952), note 5 supra.
51. See ibid. Conceivably, the section has effect only with respect to statutes passed
under the commerce clause. 91 CONG. REc. 481-83 (1945). But see United States v. Syl-
vanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952) ; 91 CUNG. REc. 479
(1945) (section applicable to all past and future federal laws).
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eral Trade Commission Act, indicates that "regulated" is a term of broader
compass than "laws," that effective implementation is as important as regula-
tory policy.
5 2
Evaluation of a given state's control should accordingly be founded upon
both the conceptual and actual reach of the sovereign's regulatory legislation.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent recognition that the McCarran Act does
not affect the FTC's power to investigate in order to establish the bounds of
its power to regulate,63 the Commission will be free to make this evaluation.
Once it determines that a state's regulation is satisfactory, it should not chal-
lenge questionable activities which are not proscribed by state law. Although
the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, enacted in thirty-eight states,5 4 closely
52. See note 49 supra. See also Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160 (1951), criticizing North
Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950), which held that the mere existence of a state statute con-
cerning the setting of insurance rates was sufficient to defeat a suit under the Sherman
Act. The note suggests that, to fulfill the purpose of the McCarran Act, rate-making
regulation must provide for and be implemented by affirmative administrative action in
order to preclude the applicability of federal antitrust statutes. See also SAWYER, IN-
SURANCE AS INTERSTATE CoMmmnEC 78-82 (1945); Travelers Health Ass'n, CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 1956-57 Transfer Binder f 26327, at 36114 (FTC 1956) (concurring opinion);
Dineen, supra note 49, at 109.
53. FTC v. Crafts, 78 Sup. Ct. 33 (1957), reversing per curiam 244 F.2d
882 (9th Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court did not write an opinion and only cited
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1.946), and Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), each of which held that the district court in normal
circumstances was not a proper body to determine the extent of an agency's investigative
jurisdiction. But if the position of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, supra note 22, were cor-
rect, the district court might have taken judicial notice that the FTC was without juris-
diction on the basis of the McCarran Act and refused to enforce the subpoena. Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra (dictum; "coverage" may be determined by district
court if investigation plainly irrelevant to agency's lawful purpose); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, supra (dictum; same). See 48 STAT. 291 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a)
(1952) (power of the Commission to investigate practices of corporations engaged in com-
merce) ; Gilmore, Governent and the Insura;ce Business, 1950 INs. L.J. 408, 408-09
(regardless of the degree of state supervision, the McCarran Act does not exclude the
FTC from exercising power to investigate).
54. With some variations, the model act has been enacted in the following states:
ARiz. CoDE ANN. §§ 61-3301 to -3318 (Supp. 1954) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1,701 to -1713
(Supp. 1957) ; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-15-1 to -13 (Supp. 1955) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 2816d-21d (Supp. 1955); DE1. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 531-38 (Supp. 1956) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 643.01-.13 (Supp. 1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-401a to -413a (Supp. 1955) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 39-5301 to -5318 (1955); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 507B.1-B.13 (Supp.
1956); ICAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2401 to -2414 (Supp. 1953); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 304.924-.945, 304.990 (1955) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANx. §§ 22:1211-:1217, 22:1455 (Supp.
1956); 'ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 60, § 146-58 (Supp. 1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 321-35 (Supp. 1957); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 176D, §§ 1-14 (Supp. 1956); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24.12001-.12050 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72.20-.33 (Supp. 1956);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 5649-01 to -12 (Supp. 1957) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1501 to -1521
(Supp. 1953), as amended, Neb. Laws 1957, c. 191; NEV. Rsv. STAT. chapters 686.390-.470
(1956) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 417, §§ 1-17 (Supp. 1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29B-1
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resembles FTC proscriptions, 55 borderline violations of either scheme might
not be condemned by the other. Should these occasions arise, the McCarran
Act dictates the supremacy of state criteria.5
6
to -14 (Supp. 1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-9-9 to -19 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. INs. LAW
§§ 270-82; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1-.13 (Supp. 1957); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 204; OHIO
REv. CODE §§ 3901..19-.23, 3923.16 (Anderson Supp. 1956) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§
117.1-.14 (Supp. 1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1151-62 (Supp. 1956); S.C. CODE
§§ 37.1201-.1223 (Supp. 1955).; S.D. CODE §§ 31.11A01-08, 31.9934 (Supp. 1952); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-1201 to -1213 (?Supp. 1957); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -9 (Supp.
1957) ; Vt. Acts 1955, c. 174; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-49 to -57 (Supp. 1956); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 3472(8)-(22), 3331 (Supp. 1957) ; Wis. STAT. §§ 207.01-.13 (1955); Wyo. Col'm.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1501 to -1512 (Supp. 1957).
55. See McCarter, supra note 24, at 89-90; 4 NEW YORK STATE IsURAN cE DEART-
MENT, EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMIPANiES 51-53 (Straub ed. 1954); Thomerson,
supra note 49, at 340-41.
56. See 91 CONG. REc 1478, 1481 (1945).
